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1. Introduction
On each occasion that the EC/EU Treaty has been amended, the European Union’s
environmental dimension has been strengthened.
1 Eachround of revisions h as greatly
enhanced the proﬁle and the impact of the European Union’s environmental policy.
In 1957 the EEC Treaty did not mention the word ‘environment’. Today, it stands
up front, central to the Union’s tasks and activities, its ‘pervasiveness’ captured by
the environmental integration obligation ‘showcased’ in Part One of the EC Treaty.
2
It would be readily understandable if, in the light of this, the environmental move-
ment had approached the Convention on the Future of Europe with some compla-
cency. Launched in February 2002, under the chairmanship of Vale ´ry Giscard d’Esta-
ing, the Convention submitted the ﬁnal text of the draft Treaty establishing a
Constitution for Europe on 18 July 2003. The Treaty is in three parts. Whereas, the
ﬁrst part sets out the Unions objectives and values, and lays the constitutional frame-
work within which it is to operate, Part II is concerned with the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the Union, and Part III, the Union’s policies.
3 There will now be a
reﬂection period prior to the launching of a traditional Intergovernmental Confer-
ence in 2004.
4
* Many thanks to Ioli Christopoulou of WWF (Europe), Richard Macrory, and Martin Rocholl of FoE
(Europe) for their valuable help in writing this article.
** Jan H. Jans is Professor of EU Law at the University of Amsterdam and Professor of Public Law at the
University of Groningen. *** Joanne Scott is Reader in European Law at the University of Cambridge, and
Fellow of Clare College, Cambridge.
1 See for a historical overview J.H. Jans, European Environmental Law (Groningen, 2000) chapter 1.
2 Article 6 EC: ‘Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the deﬁnition and imple-
mentation of the Community policies and activities referred to in Article 3, in particular witha view to promot-
ing sustainable development.’
3 For the text of the ﬁnal draft see: http://european-convention.eu.int/DraftTreaty.asp?/lang=EN.
4 See, for details of this, and for progress to date: http://european-convention.eu.int/ See also Friends of the
Earth Europe’s excellent Convention website, which brings together the relevant texts and viewpoints of the
Green 8: http://www.foeeurope.org/activities/convention/convention-article.htm The ‘Green 8’ represents eight
major international environmental organisations in Europe. These are Birdlife Europem Climate Action Net-
work Europe, the European Environmental Bureau, Friends of the Earth Europe, Friends of Nature Interna-
tional, Greenpeace International, European Federation for Transport and Environment and Worldwide Fund
for Nature. See the recent ‘Green 8’ text: ‘Towards a Green EU Constitution: Greening the EU Constitution’
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Operating in three phases (listening, deliberating and proposing), the Convention’s
methods were from the start celebrated as transparent, participatory and inclusive.
Stepping back from an elite-driven intergovernmental model, the Convention
embraced national and European parliamentarians, along withMember State repres-
entatives, and observers from the Economic and Social Committee and the Commit-
tee of the Regions. It reached out also to the accession states. A document search of
the ‘Futurum’ website reveals several hundred submissions to the Convention on an
environmental theme.
5 These emanate from a range of environmental NGOs, includ-
ing ﬁrst and foremost the ‘Green 8’.
6
A ﬁrst draft of the new constitutional treaty was published, in stages, during the
ﬁrst months of 2003. More than 1000 amendments to this were proposed by the
members of the Convention. A second draft was published only a few weeks before
the Praesidium’s ﬁnal report to the European Council. ‘The rush with which the
process will be ﬁnished really puts the transparent and participatory nature of the
process into question.’
7
For the environmental movement, these early drafts came as a nasty surprise. They
caused widespread consternation, due to the manner in which they proposed a rolling
back of the European Union’s environmental dimension. Martin Rocholl of Friends
of the Earth Europe has suggested that ‘the Convention’s Praesidium showed an
astonishing ignorance towards environmental and sustainability issues’.
8 At this time
attention focussed upon the opening articles of the proposed text (Articles 1–16,
Titles I, II and III), and in particular upon Articles 2 and 3 identifying the Union’s
values and objectives.
There was little in the ﬁrst draft of the proposed constitutional treaty to reﬂect
the Unions commitment to a high level of environmental protection. According to
this, the Union was said to be founded upon values common to the Member States,
and speciﬁcally upon ‘the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, the
rule of law and respect for human rights’.
9 This mirrors closely the existing Article
6 TEU.
10 As the Avosetta Group has noted, these values ‘appear as purely
anthropocentric . . . disregard[ing] the precarious situation of mankind in the bio-
sphere’.
11 This group proposes the incorporation of an additional value, namely
‘respect for the natural conditions of human life’.
More objectionably, the ﬁrst draft appeared to dilute the Union’s commitment to
(at: http://www.eeb.org/publications/G8-IGC-EN-ﬁnal-8-8-03.pdf) proposing numerous debated amendments to
the ﬁnal draft.
5 http://europa.eu.int/futurum/index en.htm This is somewhat misleading as the same document frequently
appears eight times on behalf of the ‘Green 8’ mentioned above.
6 There are also submissions from the Council of European Environmental Law (CEDE) chaired by Alexan-
dre Kiss, and Avosetta, a group of academic environmental lawyers. See: www.avosetta.org for the website of
this ‘small, informal group of lawyers whose main purpose is to further the development of environmental law
in the European Union’.
7 Personal communication from Martin Rocholl of Friends of the Earth Europe (7.5.03).
8 ‘The New EU Constitution: Disaster or Progress’ at http://www.foeeurope.org/activities/convention/
convention-article-2.htm.
9 Article 2 Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.
10 The reference to human dignity is new.
11 Memorandum of the Avosetta Group of 6 February 2003 at: http://europa.eu.int/futurum/forum conven-
tion/documents/contrib/acad/0331 r1 en.pdf. See F. Ermacora, ‘The Right to a Clean Environment in the Con-
stitution of the European Union’ in J.H. Jans (ed), The European Convention and the Future of European Environmental
Law (Groningen, 2003) 29–43.T H EC O N V E N T I O NO NT H EF U T U R EO FE U R O P E 325
sustainable development. Relative to the current version of Article 2 EC, the refer-
ences to sustainable development in this ﬁrst draft seemed quite meagre. Sustainable
development was to be based on economic growth, and the economic growth was to
be balanced rather than sustainable. An up-front commitment to ‘a high level of
protection and improvement of the quality of the environment’ was not included.
12
2. The Integration Principle
Yet more disconcerting than the above, for the environmental movement, was the
exclusion (or at the very least the down-grading
13)a sageneral principle of EC law of
the so called environmental integration obligation currently laid down in Article 6
EC. Since the integration principle was already part of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (Article 37) and the Charter was to be integrated in
the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Article II-37), at the Euro-
pean Convention, one might have thought that there was no reason to maintain the
integration principle as a general principle of European law.
14
The implications of the integration principle have been immense, at the political,
administrative and judicial level.
15 It has spawned or consolidated a vast range of
initiatives concerned to ensure that the environmental dimension of Community
activities are properly reﬂected in decision-making processes.
16 At the level of the
European courts, the principle has been key in justifying recourse to the mandatory
requirement relating to environmental protection to justify a directly discriminatory
barrier to trade.
17 Likewise, it has emerged as an important factor in justifying the
application of the precautionary principle outside of the environmental sphere.
18 It
has been used also in the interpretation of Directive 90/50 on public service contracts,
12 See, for example, submission of Green 8 in relation to Article 3. This proposed the reintroduction of a
reference to ‘a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment’ and for a stronger
version of the principle of inter-generational equity. Thus, they proposed that the text (Article 3(2)) read as
follows: ‘The Union shall work for a Europe of sustainable development based on . . . a high level of protection
and improvement of the quality of the environment . . . to meet the needs of the present generation with respect
for the rights of future generations.’ See, in the ﬁnal version, Article 3(3) and p 327 below.
13 At the time of the ﬁrst draft it was not yet possible to ascertain whether this principle would take its place
in the environment title under the new constitution, as opposed to up-front, as a basic principle of the Union
in Article 6 EC. See also the Resolution of the Avosetta Group adopted at their conference 11–12 October
2002, Amsterdam, published in Jan H. Jans (ed), op cit, n 11 at 117.
14 See discussion at p 327 below.
15 See, on the integration principle the comprehensive study of N. Dhondt, Integration of Environmental Protection
into other EC Policies; Legal Theory and Practice (Groningen, 2003).
16 This is not the place to explore this subject fully. See the study of Dhondt, op cit; A. Nolkaemper, ‘Three
Conceptions of the Integration Principle in International Environmental Law’; A. Lenschow, ‘New Regulatory
Approaches to ‘‘Greening EU Policies’’ (2002) 8(1)E L J19; and Kraemer, Klasing, Wilkinson and von Homeyer,
‘EU Environmental Governance: A Benchmark of Policy Instruments’ at: http://www.environment.fgov.be/Pres-
idency/Govern/Key%20Points%20for%20Discussion.pdf
17 ECJ Case C-379/98, Preua ˆenElektra [2001]E C RI - 2099.
18 And in particular in relation to the protection of public health. See T-74, 76, 83, 85, 132, 137, 141/00
Artegodan GmbH and Others v Commission judgment of 27 November 2002, para 183, deﬁning the precautionary
principle as a general principle of Community law ‘requiring the competent authorities to take appropriate
measures to prevent potential risks to public health, safety and the environment, by giving precedence to the
requirements related to the protection of those interests over economic interests’. This suggests that the prin-
ciple may be deployed as a sword as well as a shield. The judgment builds upon Case T-13/99, Pﬁzer [2002]
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leading to the conclusion that this does not exclude the possibility of using environ-
mental criteria in identifying the economically most advantageous tender.
19
The exclusion of the environmental integration obligation from the opening part
of the proposed constitutional treaty led to disagreement between environmental
activists and environmental academics. While all bemoaned its apparent fate, there
was no consensus on how to proceed in the face of this adversity. The ‘Green 8’
proposed an amendment to the then Article 8 of the proposed text. This established
a number of fundamental principles binding upon the European Union, namely the
familiar principles of subsidiarity, proportionality and ‘loyal cooperation’.
20 More par-
ticularly, they argued in favour of the introduction of a principle of policy coherence
and for the re-introduction of environmental integration as a means of achieving
this.
21 Avosetta, by way of contrast, resisted the notion that the environmental integ-
ration obligation should ﬁnd expression in Article 8. They did so ﬁrst in the name of
coherence! Article 8 (as was), they rightly argued, is concerned with ‘vertical’
(multiple levels) and not ‘horizontal’ (multiple policies) coherence. In addition, and
more importantly, they pointed out that coherence is a ‘formal’ rather than a ‘mat-
erial’ principle, and that as such it would allow the setting aside of environment
protection requirements, where these are inconsistent with other policies. This
formal principle favours coherence but does yield normative hierarchy. Thus, they
argued, that were the existing Article 6 is to be dropped, it would be preferable to
see the integration obligation re-located to the environment chapter. It is notable
that in one recent case, the European Court of First Instance appeared to view the
integration obligation relating to health in the same way as that relating to environ-
ment, though the former, unlike the latter, ﬁnds expression only in the Treaty title
relating speciﬁcally to public health.
22
In the ﬁnal version of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe the
integration principle was added, more or less on the ﬁnal days of the Convention’s
deliberations, to Title I ‘Clauses of General Application’ of Part III.
23 In Article III-4
we can therefore read the familiar text: ‘Environmental protection requirements
must be integrated into the deﬁnition and implementation of the Union policies and
activities referred to in this Part, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable
development.’ Indeed, Article III-4 reproduces, word for word, the existing Article 6
EC. While this is not to be found in Part I of the Treaty—thereby reducing its visibil-
ity, and its ‘exclusivity’—it is nonetheless to be included in the treaty.
However, one major question is how does the integration principle in Part III relate
19 Case C-513/99, Concordia Bus Finland [2002] ECR I-7213, para 57. It added the proviso that these environ-
mental criteria must be linked to the subject matter of the contract, do not confer an unrestricted freedom of
choice on the authority, are expressly mentioned in the contract documents or the tender notice, and comply
with all the fundamental principles of Community law, in particular the principle of non-discrimination.
20 This latter is presumably meant to encapsulate that which is currently laid down in Article 10 EC.
21 They propose that Article 8(5) be rewritten as follows: ‘In accordance with the principle of policy coherence,
environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the deﬁnition and implementation of the Union
policies and activities referred to in Part 3, in particular witha view to promoting sustainable development.’
22 Joined Cases T-74, 76, 83, 84, 85, 132, 137 and 141–00, Artegodan GmbH & Others v Commission judgment
of 26 November 2002, para 183
23 Also included here is a commitment to the integration of consumer protection requirements, and to ensur-
ing equal opportunities between men and woman, and the combating discrimination on a wide range of grounds.
As regards the latter, see Article III-3 which covers sex, race, ethnic origin, religion or beliefs, disability, age,
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to the integration principle in Part II (Article II-37). As mentioned above, the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights of the Union will be integrated in Part II. The wording of
Article II-37 is however slightly different from Article III-4. First, it refers only to
Union policies and not to ‘policies and activities’. Second, it does not explicitly require
integration as regards ‘the deﬁnition and implementation’ of Union policies, thus
rendering more uncertain its status vis-a `-vis Member States. Third, integration is,
according to the Article II-37, to be ensured in accordance withth e principle of
sustainable development, as opposed to witha view to promoting sustainable develop-
ment (Article III-4).
Whatever the consequences of these differences might be, it is in the light of this
all that the ﬁnal version of the proposed constitutional treaty may be viewed as some-
thing of a victory for the environmental movement. Certainly, it attests to the hard
work, and careful and continuous scrutiny, of the Green 8. Though, as we will see
below, there are still important areas of concern, one other crucial amendment was
achieved.
Article 3(3) establishing the Union’s objectives provides as follows (in paragraph
3):
The Union shall work for a Europe of sustainable development based on balanced economic
growth, a social market economy, highly competitive and aiming at full employment and social
progress, and with a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environ-
ment. It shall promote scientiﬁc and technological advance.
Moreover, in its relations with the wider world, the Union shall contribute (inter alia)
to the ‘sustainable development of the earth’.
24 Compared to earlier drafts the notion
of ‘sustainable development’ has been given a more prominent role in the European
Constitution to be.
3. Environmental Competence
Part I, Title III of the proposed constitutional treaty concerns the Union’s compet-
ence, and Part I, Title V, the exercise of this competence. Environment is explicitly
listed as an area of shared competence.
25 In this regard, ‘[w]hen the Constitution
confers on the Union a competence shared with the Member States in a speciﬁc area,
the Union and the Member States shall have the power to legislate and adopt legally
binding acts in that area. The Member States shall exercise their competence to
the extent that the Union has not exercised, or has decided to cease exercising, its
competence’.
26
It is submitted that this provision must be seen as a codiﬁcation and not as a
modiﬁcation of the law. European Environmental policy as a shared and not as an
exclusive Community policy is widely accepted in literature.
27 In the area of external
24 Article 3(4). The phrase ‘sustainable development of the earth’ is rather an odd one, but the underlying
idea is, it would seem, clear.
25 Conservation of marine biological resources under the common ﬁsheries policy as an area of exclusive
competence, though more generally conservation of marine biological resources is an area of shared competence.
See Articles 12 and 13.
26 Article 11(2).
27 See A. Epiney, ‘Division of Competence between Member States and the EC’ in J.H. Jans (ed), op cit, n
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environmental competences the Treaty stipulates the shared nature of the Commun-
ity competences. Article 175(4) provides that the Community competence to negoti-
ate and conclude international treaties ‘shall be without prejudice to Member States’
competence to negotiate in international bodies and to conclude international agree-
ments’. Recent case law of the ECJ however conﬁrmed that when external environ-
mental activities can be characterised as falling within the Community’s common
commercial policy, there is an exclusive Community competence.
28 The case law of
the Court of Justice also shows that the exercise by the Community of a shared
competence can pre-empt the Member States in exercising theirs. The notorious
Walloon Waste case is still an excellent example in this respect: the ‘complete’ har-
monisation provided by the ‘old’ transboundary waste directive pre-empted the
Belgian authorities.
29
This provision in the draft Constitution is indicative of the difﬁculties associated
with codifying complex and nuanced arrangements which have grown up pragmatic-
ally, largely on the basis of the case law of the European Court. According to this
case law, Member States may, in certain circumstances, continue to exercise compet-
ence in areas of shared competence, even after the Community has intervened. Typ-
ical in this respect—though not invariable
30—is the example of minimum harmonis-
ation.
31 Where the Community adopts a minimum harmonisation measure,
32 Member
States may adopt stricter measures in the relevant sphere, so long as these stricter
measures do not clash either with the Community measure or with other Community
law obligations, including the free movement obligations.
33 Formally, perhaps, one
might argue that the Community has only exercised its competence up to the line
constituted by the minimum harmonisation. Beyond that line, therefore, Member
States retain competence. This would be in keeping with the premises of the constitu-
tional treaty in this regard. This reading would, however, be somewhat artiﬁcial. It
fails to capture the overlapping nature of Community and Member State competences;
their co-existence within a given substantive sphere. The constitutional text seems
to draw a picture with ‘bright lines’; shared competences rest with Member States
until the Community exercises them, at which point they transfer over to the realm
of the Union. This fails to capture the reality of shared and overlapping competences,
whereby Community and Member State intervention co-mingle in a given policy
sphere, the lines between them being blurred and hard to draw.
28 Case C-281/01, Commission v Council (Energy Star), judgment of 12 December 2002, not yet reported in
the ECR.
29 Case C-2/90, Commission v Belgium [1992] ECR I-4431. See, by way of contrast, more recently, Case C-203/
96 Chemische Afvalstoffen Dusseldorp BV & Others v Minister van Volkshuisvesting [1998] ECR I-4075.
30 Case C-169/89, Criminal proceedings against Van den Burg [1990]E C RI - 2143 and Case C-1/96, The Queen/
Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte Compassion in World Farming [1998] ECR I-1251.
31 It is also the case that much Community legislation is ‘framework’ in nature, in keeping with the propor-
tionality principle. This leaves Member States considerable ﬂexibility in its implementation. ‘Implementation’
is, as such, not a mechanical act of transposition or translation. Thus, Member States retain considerable
competence even after the Union has exercised its shared competence.
32 Which, according to Article 176 EC, it does when the measure takes Article 175 EC as its legal basis; cf.
Case C-318/98, Fornasar [2000]E C RI - 4785, para 46. By the way, the Avosetta group proposed to redraft
Article 176 EC (and Article 95(4–6) EC in a more clearer way. See their Resolution in J.H. Jans (ed), op cit,
n 11 at 121. In this contribution we will not entertain this aspect any further.
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4. Hierarchy of Norms
In relation to the exercise of competence, a number of issues of signiﬁcance in the
environmental sphere may be usefully ﬂagged up.
First, is the proposal to adjust the terminology used in relation to Community acts.
This is based upon a distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts. The
former will include European laws (the equivalent to current regulations) and Euro-
pean framework laws (the equivalent to current directives). Regulations, by way of
contrast will be non-legislative for the implementation of ‘certain speciﬁc provisions
of the Constitution’.
34 Suchregulations will take one of two forms. Th ey may be
binding in their entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Alternatively,
they may be binding as to the result to be achieved, on all Member States to which
they are addressed, but leave to the Member States the form and means of achieving
the result envisaged. Thus, in the same way as there will be two forms of legislative
act (the equivalent to current regulations and directives), there will also be two forms
of implementing act, although in the latter case, each will be called a ‘regulation’.
The concept of a ‘European decision’ is henceforth to be conﬁned to binding non-
legislative instruments. These may be generally applicable or may be more conﬁned
in their personal scope.
Second, the proposed text is premised upon a new distinction between delegated
regulations and implementing acts.
35 This is of the utmost importance in the environ-
mental sphere, in view of the framework nature of much legislation and the tradition-
ally important role played bothby Member States in implementation, and by Euro-
pean ‘comitology’ committees. Though technical—and unclear—these provisions will
play a critical role in determining the horizontal and vertical balance of power in
environmental law-making.
Implementation is said to be the prerogative of the Member States, other than
where ‘uniform conditions’ for implementing binding Union acts are needed.
36 In the
latter case (implying action by the Union), implementing powers may be conferred
upon the Commission or, in the circumstances laid down, upon the Council of Minis-
ters. Union implementing acts will take the form of implementing regulations (either
one of the two variants set out previously) or implementing decisions, in accordance
with the schema set out above. The relevant European laws, providing for European
implementation, shall lay down in advance rules and general principles for the mech-
anisms for control by Member States of Union implementing acts.
37 In keeping with
current arrangements, this may be regarded as a somewhat opaque reference to the
elaborate ‘comitology’ machinery which has grown up.
38 Famously, this permits the
34 Article 32(1).
35 See Article 35 on delegated regulations and Article 36 on implementing acts.
36 More precisely, Article 36(2) provides: ‘Where uniform conditions for implementing binding Union acts
are needed, those acts may confer implementing powers on the Commission, or, in speciﬁc cases duly justiﬁed
and in the cases provided for in Article 39, on the Council of Ministers.’
37 Article 36.
38 Decision 1999/468,O J[ 1999]L 184/23; see also the Proposal for a Council Decision amending Decision
1999/468/EC laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commis-
sion; COM(2002) 719 ﬁnal. See on the duty to give reasons if and when the institutions wants to derogate from
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Council some oversight over the Commission’s exercise of its implementing powers.
Clearly though, the notion of control mechanisms is sufﬁciently open-ended to permit
evolution in this respect.
‘Delegation’ is said to be concerned withreconciling th e democratic legitimacy
associated with legislation with the need for ﬂexibility. It permits the delegation by
the legislature, to the Commission, of powers to enact regulations ‘in order to supple-
ment or amend certain non-essential elements of the law or framework law’.
39 In so
far as it is concerned withamendment, it is clearly distinguish ed from implementa-
tion above. In so far, however, as it is concerned with ‘supplementing’ rather than
‘amending’, the line between supplementing and implementing may be difﬁcult to
draw. Yet this distinction is signiﬁcant, given that in principle implementation—
unlike delegation—is to be the prerogative of the Member States (not the Commun-
ity institutions), other than where there is a need for uniform conditions for
implementation.
The vision of delegation contained in the Treaty, is clearly predicated upon a prin-
cipal/agent model. This follows not merely from the requirement that the objectives,
content, scope and duration be explicitly deﬁned by the legislature (the principal),
but also from the ‘conditions of application’ to which delegation shall be subject to,
according to the terms of the relevant legislation. ‘They may consist of the following
possibilities’:
40
— the European Parliament and the Council may decide to revoke the delegation;
— the delegated regulation may enter into force only if no objection has been expressed by
the European Parliament or the Council within a period set by the law or framework law;
In the exercise of these oversight functions, the European Parliament is to act by a
majority of its members, and the Council by a qualiﬁed majority vote. In so far as
the Council enjoys this direct oversight function, there is clearly the danger that
changes in the political mood of the Union might lead it to block the exercise of
delegated powers.
Thus, the contrast with ‘implementation’ lies not only in terms of the scope of the
delegation (non-essential elements only), but also with the nature of the political
oversight function laid down. This may be ex ante (option one above) and/or ex post
(option two above). Signiﬁcantly, this implies a greater role for the European Parlia-
ment, so long the loser in the realm of comitology. In keeping with the principal/
agent model which underpins the concept of delegation, the proposed text endorses
an ultimate control-from-above approachto accountability. Yet in areas of complex-
ity, uncertainty and rapid change (environment being a paradigm case), the extent
to which control of this kind can be meaningfully realised is open to doubt.
41 It is to
be regretted that while the European Union has emerged as a hotbed of experimenta-
Council and EP, not yet reported in the ECR. The judgment concerned the partial annulment of Regulation
1655/2000 on a ﬁnancial instrument for the environment.
39 Article 35(1).
40 Article 35(2). A third mechanism proposed in the original version has been dropped. This provided for the
automatic lapsing of the provisions of the delegated regulation, after the period laid down in the law or the
framework law. In this event, it was to be open to the European Parliament and the Council, on a proposal
from the Commission, to extend their application. Though less explicit than in the earlier draft, this would
seem to leave open the possibility for the simultaneous application of the two mechanisms.
41 Breyer, Sunstein and Stewart, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy (Aspen Law and Business, 2002).T H EC O N V E N T I O NO NT H EF U T U R EO FE U R O P E 331
tion in the structuring of administrative discretion, the constitutional text looks set
to ignore this, in favour of a appealingly simple, but ultimately unproductive, prin-
cipal/agent approach.
42
Indeed, even when the constitutional text comes to the issue of transparency, it
contains no speciﬁc obligations for the Commission in the exercise of its delegated
or implementing powers. It, like the other Union institutions, will be obliged to con-
duct its work ‘as openly as possible’.
43 However, while there is an explicit requirement
that the European Parliament and the Council meet in public, when discussing a legislat-
ive proposal, no speciﬁc provision is made in relation to the transparency of adminis-
trative proceedings. Likewise, in relation to participatory democracy’, this principle
is laid down in general terms, and does not establishany speciﬁc requirements in
relation to the adoption of delegated or implementing acts.
44 The working group on
complementary competences ‘generally approved’ of the idea set forth in a paper
submitted to the Convention, that a speciﬁc legal basis be inserted into the Treaty
for the adoption of rules on ‘good administration, efﬁciency and openness’ for the EU
institutions.
45 Nonetheless, this does not seem to have found favour with the Conven-
tion as a whole.
46
It is notable also in this respect that the Convention did not endorse the suggestion
of the working group on ‘Complementary Competences’ that, in view of the common
interest in the quality of national administration of EU legislation, the Union should
be authorised to assist Member States by facilitating exchange of information and
persons related to administration of EU law, and to support common training and
development programmes.
47 To this end, the Working Group proposed that this be
added as an additional area of ‘supporting measures’ under Article 15 of the constitu-
tional text. It is, of course, the case that Community directives in the environmental
sphere frequently constrain Member States in their manner of implementation. They
contain a plethora of provisions setting out participation and transparency require-
ments at the national level, and instituting comprehensive reporting obligations. Such
requirements have tended to be strengthened over time. The directive on environ-
mental impact assessment is indicative in this respect. Not only is the role of public
participation reinforced in the amended version, but the related directive on strategic
environmental impact assessment contains novel and far-ranging consultation obliga-
tions, obliging Member States, inter alia, to consult withrelevant non-governmental
organisations. Notwithstanding a continuing emphasis upon the proportionality of
Union legislation, and upon the primary role to be played by Member States in its
implementation, the principles according to which implementation is to be achieved
remains to be determined on a case by case basis.
42 One of the crucial questions in terms of Union implementation/delegation will be the relative degree of
decision-making autonomy enjoyed by the Commission. To the extent that Member State control over Union
implementation would seem to imply the continuation of comitology structures, the Commission may well prefer
to see matters deﬁned in legislation as ‘supplementing’ rather than ‘implementing’, and hence subject to ex
post and ex ante control, rather than participation in committee governance.
43 Article 49(1).
44 See Article 34.
45 Working Group V at p 17.
46 See though the discussion at pp 334–5 below on Community level access to environmental information.
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5. Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality
Still on the theme of competences, one of the most interesting aspects of the proposed
constitutional text concerns the amendments to the existing Protocol on the applica-
tion of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Based upon an inter-
institutional agreement drawn up at the Edinburgh summit at the end of 1994,t he
proposed protocol seeks to strengthen this principle. As an area of shared compet-
ence, subsidiarity is applicable to the environmental sphere. It has been since its
inception. That said, very often the reasons set out justifying compliance with this
principle on the part of environmental legislation are very thin; a general allusion to
transboundary spill-overs here, and to the equalisation of conditions of competition
there. Yet the implications of this principle in the environmental sphere are hotly
contested.
48 In that the new protocol is intended to reinforce the institutional mech-
anisms for overseeing compliance withsubsidiarity, th e Commission would do well to
take seriously its obligation to include a detailed statement in its legislative proposals,
suchas to facilitate compliance withth is principle.
The model established by the protocol rests upon greater involvement of national
parliaments. Thus, the Commission, European Parliament and the Council are to
send their legislative proposals, resolutions and common positions to the national
parliaments of the Member States. Any such parliament may, within six weeks, send
to the institution concerned, a reasoned opinion stating why it considers that the
proposal in question does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. The relevant
institution will ‘take account’ of such reasoned opinions. Where the national parlia-
ments making such submissions ‘represent at least one third of all the votes allocated
to the Member States’ national Parliaments and their chambers’ the Commission
shall review its proposal. After such review, the commission may maintain, amend or
withdraw its proposal, giving reasons for its decision.
49
Also novel is the explicit recognition in the protocol of the jurisdiction of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice on grounds of infringement of the principle of subsidiarity. This
is stated to be largely limited to actions brought by the Member States, although
where appropriate, and in accordance with domestic constitutional rules, these will
be launched at the request of a national parliament. Signiﬁcantly, the draft also
anticipates that the Committee of the Regions may enjoy standing in this respect, as
regards legal acts upon which it was consulted.
The draft protocol raises many issues and questions of legal interpretation.
First, it would seem that a strengthening of subsidiarity comes at the price of
proportionality. Contrary to the text of the existing protocol, the draft has little to
say on this latter principle. Differing at least to an earlier version, the Protocol now
provides that any legislative proposal should contain a detailed statement making it
possible to appraise compliance withproportionality as well as subsidiarity. Noneth e-
less, gone it would seem is the elaboration of what this entails, both procedurally
50
and in terms of legal form. This includes the stated preference for framework direct-
48 See W. Wils, ‘Subsidiarity: Taking People’s Concerns Seriously?’ (1994) 6 JEL 85–91.
49 It would seem that a similar procedure to be put in place to allow national parliaments to issue reasoned
opinions on Council common positions or in respect of amendments proposed by the European Parliament has
been dropped.
50 Though we are left with an annual reporting obligation on the part of the Commission (only).T H EC O N V E N T I O NO NT H EF U T U R EO FE U R O P E 333
ives (bearing in mind that, according to the current draft, directives will henceforth
be known as framework laws), the idea that Community law should leave as much
scope for national decision as is possible, and wherever possible provide alternative
ways for the achievement of its objectives.
51 Article 9(4) in Part I of the constitutional
treaty is itself skeletal in the extreme, providing merely that ‘the content and form
of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the
Constitution’.
In keeping with this, it is plain that as the protocol currently stands, the oversight
mechanism constituted by it, through recourse to national parliaments, is limited to
the sphere of subsidiarity and not proportionality. This ‘early-warning’ system
52 could
easily and usefully be extended to cover the intensity (proportionality) as well as the
need for (subsidiarity) Community action.
Second, it remains unclear as to whether the proposed protocol is intended to
deprive all but the speciﬁed institutions of standing to challenge Community acts on
subsidiarity grounds. Recall that the current draft singles out only the Member States
and, in more limited circumstances, the Committee of the Regions. It thus excludes
certain of those considered as ‘privileged applicants’ under Article 230 EC (proposed
Article III-270(4)) as it currently stands, notably the European Parliament whose
status was consolidated by changes introduced at Nice.
Third, the draft protocol is clear that national parliaments do not enjoy any inde-
pendent right of standing before the European Court.
53 The most that could be
argued in this respect is that the Protocol would impose a procedural obligation on
Member States to consider whether it is appropriate, and in accordance with domestic
constitutional rules, to institute any action requested by a national parliament.
54
Finally, the protocol imposes obligations upon the various Community actors at
different stages of the legislative process. They are to take account of the reasoned
opinions of national parliaments, or the fullest account in the case of the European
Parliament and the Council, pending a Conciliation Committee meeting. As noted,
the Commission will be obliged to review its proposal where at least one third of
national parliaments submit reasoned opinions. As things currently stand it would
not be open to any actor to seek review of any proposal, common position, or resolu-
tion, on the basis of a failure to comply adequately with these duties. This ﬂows from
the absence of binding legal effects associated with measures of this kind. They do
not constitute ‘acts’ within the meaning of Article 230 EC. The question nonetheless
51 Currently the Protocol provides: ‘(6) The form of Community action shall be as simple as possible, consist-
ent with satisfactory achievement of the objective of the measure and the need for effective enforcement. The
Community shall legislate only to the extent necessary. Other things being equal, directives should be preferred
to regulations and framework directives to detailed measures. Directives as provided for in Article 189 of the
Treaty, while binding upon each Member State to which they are addressed as to the result to be achieved,
shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. (7) Regarding the nature and the
extent of Community action, Community measures should leave as much scope for national decision as possible,
consistent with securing the aim of the measure and observing the requirements of the Treaty. While respecting
Community law, care should be taken to respect well established national arrangements and the organisation
and working of Member States’ legal systems. Where appropriate and subject to the need for proper enforce-
ment, Community measures should provide Member States with alternative ways to achieve the objectives of
the measures.’
52 Working Group I, Comments on the Draft Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments, p 14.
53 This is true under Article 230 EC generally. The same is true also for subnational governments.
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remains as to whether a failure to comply properly with one or more of these proced-
ural obligations, would constitute a breachof an essential procedural requirement,
such to vitiate the legal measure adopted. Relevant also is the standard of review
adopted by the European Court. The grounds for challenge here would not be subsidi-
arity as such, but breach of a procedural obligations designed to ensure its observ-
ance. It is not hard to see that the latter could occur in the absence of a breach of
the former. In this respect, the fact that national parliaments are entirely non-
privileged actors under Article 230 EC would not seem to preclude their standing,
at least in so far as they were responsible for the submission of reasoned opinions.
This ﬂows from the special status accorded by the European Court to actors with
special authority to participate in the procedures leading to the adoption of the con-
tested decision.
55
6. The Democratic Life of the Union
6.1 Participatory Democracy
While the Commission is to retain the sole right of initiative in the environmental
sphere,
56 the draft treaty contains one signiﬁcant initiative in this respect. Article
46(4), in the context of participatory democracy, provides:
A signiﬁcant number of citizens, no less than one million, coming from a signiﬁcant number
of Member States may invite the Commission to submit any appropriate proposal on matters
where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of imple-
menting this Constitution. A European law shall determine the provisions for the speciﬁc
procedures and conditions required for sucha citizens’ initiative.
There is much in the provisions on participatory democracy to appeal to the environ-
mental movement, and the response of the G8 has been positive in the main. The
relevant provisions are under-speciﬁed and their effectiveness will depend upon their
detailed elaboration. Nonetheless, they attest to the Union’s growing commitment to
transparency, consultations and civil dialogue. Thus, Article 46 provides that ‘[t]he
Union Institutions shall, by appropriate means, give citizens and representative asso-
ciations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views on all
areas of Union action’, that ‘[t]he Union Institutions shall maintain an open, trans-
parent and regular dialogue withrepresentative associations and civil society’, and
that ‘[t]he Commission shall carry out broad consultations with parties concerned in
order to ensure that the Union’s actions are coherent and transparent’.
57
6.2 Access to Information
One aspect of participatory democracy has been improved and that concerns access to
(environmental) information at the EU level. Article I-49(3) of the draft Constitution
55 For a discussion of the relevant case law see P. Craig and G. de Bu ´rca, Text, Cases and Materials on EU Law,
3rd edn (OUP, 2002).
56 See generally Article 25(2).
57 In the Communication titled Towards a Reinforced Culture of Consultation and Dialogue, the Commission has
established some general principles and minimum standards for the consultation of interested parties by the
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provides that ‘any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or
having its registered ofﬁce in a Member State shall have a right of access to docu-
ments of the Union Institutions, bodies and agencies in whatever form they are pro-
duced’.
58 The existing Article 255 EC (and its implementing measure Regulation
1049/2001
59 of the Council, Commission and EP) only deals right of access to Euro-
pean Parliament, Council and Commission documents. Broadening the scope of the
obligation to ‘bodies and agencies’ must be welcomed.
60 At least one major problem
regarding access to information has not been solved by the draft Constitution and
that is the practice of the Commission not to make available to interested citizens
information regarding the use of infringement-proceedings against the member
states.
61 In this respect a reference to Article 4(4)(c) of the Arhus Convention
62 is
applicable. It provides that ‘a request for environmental information may be refused
if the disclosure would adversely affect:
[...]
The course of justice, the ability of a person to receive a fair trial or the ability of a public
authority to conduct an enquiry of a criminal or disciplinary nature’.
This clause does not seem to include restrictions as practised by the Commission
regarding documents pertaining to environmental infringement proceedings.
6.3 Access to Justice
There is, however, one important theme which is entirely absent from this commit-
ment to participatory democracy; namely access to justice. The European Court of
Justice has recently conﬁrmed its restrictive stance on the question of ‘individual
concern’, thereby all but excluding individuals and environmental groups from access
to judicial review.
63 It had been hoped—and battled for on the part of the Green 8—
that in keeping with the spirit of the Aarhus Convention, the Union would take this
opportunity to relax its outrageously restrictive approachto standing. Also th e Avo-
setta Group had advocated a loosening of the criteria of Article 230 EC. Avosetta
proposed to redraft Article 230(4) EC in order to enhance the possibilities of NGOs
and other concerned parties to bring an action before the ECJ for annulment of
measures affecting the environment. They suggested either deleting the words ‘and
58 Italics added by the authors.
59 OJ [2001]L 145/43.
60 See J.H. Jans, ‘EU Environmental Policy and the Civil Society’, op cit, n 11 at 63–4. This may be thought
to be driven by the case law of the European Courts in this respect. See, for example, Case T-188/97 Rothmans
International v Commission [1999] ECR II-2463, in relation to access to comitology documents.
61 See on this issue L. Kra ¨mer, ‘Vertraulichkeit und O ¨ffentlichkeit; Europa ¨isches Vorverfahren und Zugang
zu Informationen’ in L. Kra ¨mer (ed), Recht und Um-Welt; Essays in Honour of Prof Dr Gerd Winter (Groningen,
2003) 153–70.
62 Signed, but not yet ratiﬁed by the EC: see the proposal for a Council Decision on the signature by the
European Community of the UN/ECE Convention on access to information, public participation and access to
justice in environmental matters; COM/98/0344 ﬁnal.
63 See the ‘old’ environmental case law: Case C-321/95 P Greenpeace v Commission [1998] ECR I-1651 and
T-219/95, Danielsson a.o. [1995] ECR II-3051. The approach of the Court is still pretty much the same, as can
be distilled from Case C-50/00 P, UPA, ECR [2002] 6677 and Case C-142/00 P, Commission v Netherlands Antilles,
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individual’ or replacing the term ‘individual’ with ‘signiﬁcant’ in this paragraph.
64
This has not occurred. First of all there is no reference to access to justice in the
provisions on participatory democracy. Secondly, although the text of Article 230(4)
is to be changed, this change will not have a signiﬁcant effect for the ﬁeld of environ-
mental protection. The new text (Article III-270(4) of the draft constitution reads:
‘Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, institute proceedings
against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to
him, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to him without entailing implementing
measures.’
65
This provision would have helped neither Greenpeace nor Ms. Danielsson in the
cases mentioned above. Even under the new text of Article III-270(4) their actions for
annulment of Commission decisions would—without any doubt—have been declared
inadmissible. Therefore we must conclude that legal protection of individuals and
NGO’s to challenge acts of the European institutions which affect the environment
remains problematic.
7. Policies: Nothing Changed, Nothing Gained
7.1 Articles 174–176 EC Remain Unchanged
The draft Constitutional Treaty leaves essentially unchanged Articles 174, 175 and
176 EC (proposed Articles III-129 and III-131). Withrespect to th e environmental
principles listed in Article 174 EC the Avosetta group had proposed the following
amendments: (a) to include in Article 174 (1) fourthindent a reference to possible
‘unilateral’ measures. The text of Article 174 (1) fourthindent will th en read as
follows:
promoting measures at international level to deal withregional or worldwide environmental
problems. Such measures may include unilateral ones, without prejudice to other international
obligations’. (b) to include in Article 174(2) the principle of ‘sustainable development’. (c) to
include in Article 174(2) the principle of ‘inter-generational equity’.
The text of Article 174(2, second sentence) should then read as follows:
It shall be based on the principle of sustainable development, the principle of inter-
generational equity, the precautionary principle and on the principle that preventive action
should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be recti?ed at source and
that the polluter should pay.
They also were of the opinion that all decisions on environmental affairs (Articles
174–176 EC) should be taken by co-decision and that as a consequence the second
paragraphof Article 175 should be deleted. National sovereignty in taxation matters
proved to be an insurmountable obstacle in this respect.
64 Resolution of the Avosetta Group adopted at their conference 11–12 October 2002, Amsterdam, published
in J.H. Jans (ed), op cit, n 11 at 121. See also J.H. Jans, ‘EU Environmental Policy and the Civil Society’, ibid
at 55–67, in particular para 4 of that contribution.
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7.2 Free Movement of Goods and Environmental Protection
An adequate balancing of trade and environmental interests still is one of the more
problematic issues in European law. In essence, the problem can be analysed as fol-
lows. Environmental objectives can serve as a justiﬁcation for Community and
national measures affecting the proper functioning of the internal market. Looking
at this from a constitutional perspective: environmental objectives are an exception
to the main rule which is free movement. To bring environmental interests onto the
same footing as trade interests, the Avosetta group proposed to include in the Treaty
the following provision: ‘Subject to imperative reasons of overriding public interest,
signiﬁcantly impairing the environment or human health shall be prohibited’. The
Green 8 likewise propose that environmental protection be included in the new ver-
sion of Article 50 (Article III-43). The intention of this is to ensure that environ-
mental interests/protection has at least the same priority as free trade. Second, the
intention is to give environmental protection direct effect, to oblige EU institutions
as well as Member States and their citizens to refrain from taking decisions or under-
taking activities which signiﬁcantly impair the environment or human health, unless
suchimpairment can be justiﬁed by an overriding public interest. Th e draft Constitu-
tion did not consider the issue at all.
A related problem in the European trade and environment debate concerns the
wording of Article 30 EC. Above we pointed to the recent case law of the ECJ ,
where the integration principle has been used by the Court to justify recourse to the
mandatory requirement relating to ‘environmental protection’ to justify a directly
discriminatory barrier to trade.
66 Amongst other authors, Winter pointed to earlier
case law of the ECJ which regarded environmental protection as a unique category
of legal justiﬁcation besides Article 30 EC but limited its application to measures
which did not distinguish between domestic and foreign products.
67 Winter argued
that as a result the notion of ‘life of humans, animals or plants’ in Article 30 EC was
somewhat overstretched. In view of this mismatch between ‘wording and meaning’,
Winter proposed to insert into Article 30 EC the words, ‘and of the environment’
after ‘the protection of health and life of humans’. In the draft Constitution however
the text of Article 30 EC (proposed Article III-43) remains untouched.
8. Conclusion
The draft constitutional text submitted to the Council on 20 June 2003 is by no
means ideal from an environmental perspective.* The Green 8 regret, for example,
the annexing of a protocol amending the Euratom Treaty. They highlight—with
regret—certain issues discussed above, notably those pertaining to access to justice,
66 ECJ Case C-379/98, PreußenElektra [2001]E C RI - 2099. One can also make a reference to Case C-67/97
Ditlev Bluhme [1998] ECR I-8033 and, muchearlier, Case C- 2/90 Commission v Belgium [1992] ECR I-4431.
67 G. Winter, ‘Environmental Principles in Community Law’ in J.H. Jans (ed), op cit, n 11 at 1–25, in particu-
lar at 14.
* Supra n 4. ‘Towards a Green EU Constitution’ for an excellent overview of the deﬁciencies and detailed
suggestions for improvement. Much of this focuses upon Part III concerning the policies and functioning of the
Union, and proposes the integration of an environmental dimension into other Union policies such as agricul-
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and to the need revise the Part III policies to reﬂect the Union’s overarching goal of
sustainable development. They propose the inclusion of a protocol on sustainable
development. That said, what we see now is markedly better than that which was put
forth in the original draft text. The environmental changes instituted along the way
are immensely signiﬁcant. Without them, the integration obligation would have been
lost, and the environmental dimension of sustainable development diluted.
These successes were achieved due to the open and participatory nature of the
Convention, and the professionalism and organisation of a range of environmental
groups, notably the Green 8. These groups combined traditional activism at the Con-
vention (handing out ﬂyers, and anti-Euratom buttons), with careful and continuous
monitoring of the proceedings. The results of this monitoring was made available
through continuously updated websites and information brieﬁngs. Such was the scale
and intensity of the proceedings that, absent this level of coordination and organis-
ation, transparency would have been an illusion.
It is notable that the Convention led to the establishment of important alliances;
both within the environmental movement and across different spheres of interest.
Thus, for example, the activities of ‘Act4Europe’ bear mention in this respect.
68 This
includes trade unions representatives, social and environmental organisations, human
rights, and development, groups. In an exercise of ‘benchmarking of the Convention’,
Act4Europe issued an ‘end-of-term report card’ assessing the outcome of the Conven-
tion against their key demands set forth in a common statement on 24 June 2002,
and against the current acquis.
69 Test two was concerned withsustainable develop-
ment and the overall assessment is bleak.
70 The report card nonetheless concludes
withth e following statement:
The working-methods of a European Convention have been a major improvement compared
with the traditional method of Inter-Governmental Conferences. We would like to acknow-
68 http://www.act4europe.org/code/en/hp.asp.
69 See: http://www.act4europe.org/code/en/civi.asp?Page=94.
70 ‘Test 2: Incorporate the Lisbon and Gothenburg agreements within the Treaties in order to guarantee a
sustainable development in which social and environmental dimension have an equal weight to the economic
dimension. Assessment: No progress. The Treaty remains too focused around the single market and economic
goals, without recognising fully that the economy should be a tool for the promotion of social integration and
the protection of the environment within the European Union.’ After eight months of campaigning, at the
closing stages of its work, the Convention restored the concept of sustainable development as it was laid down
in the Amsterdam Treaty. We support the proposal of Commissioner Wallstro ¨m to add a Protocol on Sustainable
Development to the Constitution and have published amendments to strengthen the proposed text.
Article I-14 (the coordination of economic and employment policies) does not secure coordination between
economic, employment, and social policies. Suchcoordination between policies is a necessary element if th e
social objectives of Lisbon are to be realised. Furthermore, in order to ensure sustainable development it is also
necessary that policy coordination should incorporate the environmental dimension as added by the Gothenburg
Summit.
The current principle of integrating the environment into all Union policies, the basic requirement in making
sustainable development work, was not given the prominent place it had in the Amsterdam Treaty. However,
it has now been placed under the horizontal principles at the beginning of Part III on ‘The Policies and Func-
tioning of the Union’. We will campaign to ensure that this new place will lead to more and not less respect
for this important principle in the EU’s daily practice.
A major ﬂaw in the Convention’s proposal is that it leaves many ageing EU policies in Part III untouched.
As a result, the objectives laid down in several of the policy chapters, such as agriculture, transport, economic
and social cohesion, and internal market contradict the sustainable development requirements of the Union.
The proposal to annex the 50-year-old Euratom Treaty, as a Protocol, to the new Constitution is entirely
unacceptable as it retains a preferential ﬁnancial and institutional framework for nuclear power, which has no
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ledge the many efforts made by Convention members who spoke out for and supported
demands from civil society organisations. However, in the future, we believe transparency
could be further improved and the dialogue with civil society has to be better organised and
more regular.
As suggested by this, few would dispute that the Convention process constituted a
radical improvement on traditional inter-governmentalism. Equally, though, few
would deny that the process was far from idea from the perspective of participatory
democracy. Ioli Christopoulou, then of WWF (Europe), like many others, singled out
two factors to exemplify these shortcomings.
71
First, only one civil society hearing was held by the Convention throughout the
entire process; this in June 2002. Additional hearings, later in the day following
the publication of the ﬁrst draft text, would have provided high-proﬁle and effective
opportunities for civil society organisations to feed their perspectives and expertise
into the decision-making process. Certainly, alternatives were available and were
exploited, notably in the form of contact with individual Convention members.
Second, most would agree that the pace of the Convention process, particularly
during the ﬁrst half of 2003, was absurdly fast. This rendered the task of monitoring
and effective participation extremely demanding; not merely for civil society groups,
but for Convention members themselves.
71 Personal communication of 29 June 2003.